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Hate speech is the new narrative in Kenya’s political discourse. This rhetoric has been 
employed to galvanise one’s supporters against an opposing group. The opposing group is 
often another ethnic community. This is validated by the sources of information considered in 
this study: journal articles, statute, and case law all seem to recognise that ethnicity is central 
in Kenya. Over and above being ethnic, hate speech presents a tangible danger to the fabric of 
society, the common good. A damning example of the realisation of this threat is the 2007 Post-
Election Violence. The Director of Public Prosecutions has been charged with dealing with 
instances of hate speech via prosecuting them, with the aim of convictions. In this way, the law 
can act as a deterrent. The reality however, paints a different picture. Instances of acquittal of 
politicians based on procedural technicalities and the use of nolle prosequi orders without 
sufficient legal cause have become the norm. The inconsistency in the application of 
prosecutorial powers has rendered hate speech laws in Kenya nigh ineffective in dealing with 
hate speech perpetrated by persons of influence. This study seeks to elucidate the extent of 
these inconsistencies and attempt to establish a root cause. It will also show that there is in 
fact, a cause and effect relationship between hate speech and the occurrence of violence. In 
doing so, another approach to prosecuting hate speech will be suggested, based on instances 
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Definition of terms 
 
Nolle prosequi, A formal entry upon the record, by the plaintiff in a civil suit or the prosecuting 
officer in a criminal action, by which he declares that he "will no further prosecute" the case, 
either as to some of the counts, or some of the defendants, or altogether1. 
Hate speech, the use of threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displays any 
written material; the publishing of such material; the presentation or directing of such material 
in the form of a play; the distribution of shows or plays, and recordings of visual images with 
such material; or the provision, production, or direction of a programme2.  
Incite (to violence) To arouse; stir up; instigate; sec in motion; as, to "incite" a riot. Also, 
generally, in criminal law to instigate, persuade, or move another to commit a crime3. 
Common good the social condition that allows everyone, as an individual and a group to 
achieve the good, this is the responsibility of the political class 4. 
Prudence, the ability to govern and discipline oneself using reason5. 
  
                                                 
1 –<https://thelawdictionary.org/nolle-prosequi/> on 29 January 2018. 
2 Section 13, National Cohesion and Integration (Act No. 12 of 2008). 
3 –<https://thelawdictionary.org/incite/> on 29 January 2018.  
4 Aristotle, Politics, Book I, 1252a 1-6. 
5 –<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prudence> on 29 January 2018. 
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Attorney General (AG) 
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Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) 
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Kenya National Commission of Human Rights (KNCHR) 
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National Cohesion and Integration Act (NCI Act) 
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) 





1.1 Background of the problem 
The 2010 Constitution of Kenya (CoK) transferred the powers of prosecution from the Attorney 
General (AG) to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP)6. Whereas in the 
previous constitution, the AG had full standing to be enjoined in any criminal matter7; this 
transfer was done to comply with the principle of separation of powers8. The overarching 
rationale for this separation posited by legal scholars is the role Kenya’s centralized 
government played in hindering the AG’s exercise of prosecutorial powers9. It is understood, 
that the executive at the time had vested within itself the powers to control the prosecution. 
This would open the AG to dismissal at will for decisions made against the executive, as a 
result, its security of tenure was always at stake10. This was not merely due to the political 
climate of the time. The power to dismiss the AG was enshrined in law as the 1986 
constitutional amendment11,  that effectively deleted the security of tenure of the AG12. This 
substantive change in the law limited prosecutorial powers by political influence, and had an 
adverse effect on the AG’s impartiality, an essential norm in the practice of prosecution13. 
                                                 
6 Article 156, Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
7 Article 26(3), Constitution of Kenya (1964). 
8 Mbondenyi M and Ambani J, The New Constitutional Law of Kenya, Claripress Limited, Nairobi, 2012, 68. 
9 Wainyoike W, ‘The Director of Public Prosecutions and The Constitution: Inspiration, Challenges and 
Opportunities’ in Ghai YP and Ghai JC (eds), The Legal Profession and the New Constitutional Order, Strathmore 
University Press, 2014, 173. 
10 Waikwa, ‘The Director of Public Prosecutions and The Constitution: Inspiration, Challenges and 
Opportunities’, 174. 
11 Constitution of Kenya Amendment (Act No. 14 of 1986). 
12 Waikwa, ‘The Director of Public Prosecutions and The Constitution: Inspiration, Challenges and 
Opportunities’,174. 
13 Republic vs. Chief Magistrate’s Court at Mombasa Ex Parte Ganijee & Another [2002] 2 KLR 703. 
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The powers of the ODPP are defined clearly by the CoK and the ODPP Act14. Article 157 of 
the CoK establishes the office, elaborates on how the Director of Public Prosecutions will be 
appointed, and delineates the powers of prosecution15. The ODPP Act specifies the way the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) will conduct prosecutions or drop a prosecution through 
the exercise of the power of nolle prosequi16. Powers of conducting prosecution or dropping 
prosecution and their use have also been discussed in recent cases in the High Court of Kenya 
and the appellate Court17. Within the research, this jurisprudence will be analysed to clarify the 
Kenyan theory of prosecution. 
This dissertation seeks to address the exercise of the discretionary powers of the ODPP, its 
locus standi in any criminal matter and the power of nolle prosequi; and the application of 
these powers to the jurisprudence on hate speech in Kenya. It is not the aim of this paper to 
discuss political undertones that affect the ODPP. A nexus will be established however, 
between any specific laws and judicial decisions made and the political effect that these laws 
were bound to produce. This discussion will be substantiated by institutional reports and 
existing literature. 
Parliament made provisions to define hate-speech. These provisions act as a guide for courts 
of law in adjudication of such matters. Two Acts of Parliament define terms relevant to the 
research, these being hate-speech and incitement-to-violence: The Election Offences Act (EO 
                                                 
14 Office of The Director of Public Prosecutions (Act No. 2 of 2013). 
15 Article 157, Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
16 Section 5, Office of The Director of Public Prosecutions (Act No. 2 of 2013). 
17 GV Odunga J provides thorough analysis of Kenyan public prosecution theory in cases that he adjudicated 
upon: Republic v Director of Public Prosecution & another Ex Parte Chamanlal Vrajlal Kamani & 2 others 
[2015] eKLR; and Republic v The Director of Public Prosecution ex-parte Victory Welding Works Limited and 
another Nairobi High Court Misc. Civil Application No. 249 of 2012. 
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Act) of 201618 and the National Cohesion and Integration Act (NCI Act) of 200819. The EO 
Act is a relatively young law enacted in 201620. It empowers the DPP to prosecute hate speech 
and crimes of incitement within the context of an election21. 
The NCI Act was passed by parliament two years prior to the promulgation of the CoK22, which 
makes it clear that the Commission is empowered to investigate and make recommendations 
to the AG (read: ODPP) and the Kenya National Commission of Human Rights (KNCHR) on 
matters regarding the abuse of rights due to ethnic incitement and hate speech23. 
The CoK establishes a balance between utterances of hate speech and the right to freedom of 
expression24. While every person has the right to seek and express ideas through scientific 
research or artistic expression25, the right does not fall within the spheres of “propaganda for 
war, incitement to violence, hate speech and advocacy for hatred”26. 
The legislature formulated the NCI Act since hate speech had become a prevalent phenomenon 
in the country due to the pervasive effects of tribalism in general27. One of the root causes of 
violence according to the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission Report (TJRC) was the 
use of incitement in the public sphere by politicians or media personalities28.   
                                                 
18 Election Offences (Act No. 37 of 2016). 
19 National Cohesion and Integration (Act No. 12 of 2008). 
20 Senate Hansard Report, 7 September 2016, 6. 
21 Section 21, Election Offences (Act No. 37 of 2016). 
22 The NCIC Act had contemplated that the prerogative to prosecute still belonged to the AG. Section 1, National 
Cohesion and Integration (Act No. 12 of 2008). 
23 Section 25(2)(h), National Cohesion and Integration (Act No. 12 of 2008). 
24 Article 33(1), Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
25 Article 33(1), Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
26 Article 33(2), Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
27 Parliament Hansard Report, 12 March 2008, 1. 
28 Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission, TJRC Final Report-Volume 11B, 2013, 308. 
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In addition, this paper will probe local and international case law, to compare the application 
of norms of prosecution. The case of Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor29 will be used to 
elucidate the norms of prosecuting hate speech, and its link with violence. The norms 
established in international courts will then be compared to actual practice in Kenyan courts, 
four cases will be probed in depth, Alan Wadi Okengo v Republic30, Chirau Alimwakwere v 
Robert M. Mabera & 4 others31, Johnstone Muthama & 8 others v Inspector General of Police 
& 2 others32, and Republic v Moses Kuria33. This analysis will seek to outline inconsistencies 
in the exercise of the discretionary powers of the ODPP. Most of these cases ended in acquittal 
or via nolle prosequi orders entered at the Magistracy. Their purpose is to illustrate the 
discrepancies that exist in the application of prosecution theory. As such, the cases are not 
being used to examine precedence, since the Magistrate Courts do not have this power. This 
study seeks to probe why the cases ended in an acquittal despite the existence of compelling 
evidence that the accused persons made statements that fall within the legally defined domain 
of hate speech. These cases deal with similar legal phenomena, yet their outcomes were vastly 
different. The research will endeavour to study the reasons behind the difference in outcomes. 
It is a requirement in law for the ODPP to provide reasons why it intends to undertake or drop 
a suit34, such reasons given (or not given) will be probed based on their legal implications. 
Subsequently, the secondary aim of investigation will be the impact that these decisions would 
have on the notion of the rule of law and the common good of the people in Kenya. This section 
of the research will take a deductive reasoning approach. General principles will be tested 
                                                 
29 The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze, ICTR Appeal Judgement 
of 28 November 2007. 
30 [2015] eKLR. 
31 [2012] eKLR. 
32 [2016] eKLR. 
33 [2016] eKLR. 
34 Article 157(8), Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
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against the legal phenomena to draw logical conclusions. The methodology will facilitate the 
analysis of the effect of what others may perceive as the ODPP’s apparent laxity in prosecuting 
hate speech on the public. Moreover, due to the impact on the people of Kenya, there is need 
to interpret the situation from the perspective of the principle of the common good. Within this 
perspective, the nexus can be established between hate speech and the destruction of the social 
order. 
The principles of prudence and the common good in this part will be inspired by Aristotelian 
notions on the role of leaders. Negative rhetoric disrupts the social order; therefore, it is 
essential that the ODPP finds more efficient mechanisms to prevent the impact of incendiary 
rhetoric. 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
The problem that the paper seeks to investigate is two pronged: the inconsistency in the 
application of the ODPP’s discretionary powers specifically nolle prosequi, and the impact this 
inconsistency has on the rule of law and consequently the common good of society. 
1.3 Purpose and importance of the study 
The purpose of the study was to investigate the use of the ODPP’s nolle prosequi power 
regarding the prosecution of hate speech perpetrated by leaders. As a corollary, the study will 
explore the pervasive effects of hate speech on the Kenyan public. 
This research may prove to be timely. Due to the socio-political environment that builds 
towards the elections. Hate speech is a tool oft used in this socio-political environment, 
resulting in the amplification of tension and sometimes, violence. The public’s descent into 
violent conduct can be stopped by the independent exercise of the ODPP’s nolle prosequi 
power. If used effectively, the prosecutor’s discretion can be an effective deterrent, it can 





Would the swift and conclusive prosecution of hate speech by the ODPP lead to unity in Kenya 
and the achievement of the common good? 
1.5 Methodology 
This research was limited to desk research. Sources of information included books, institutional 
reports from the KNCHR and TJRC, local and international case law, Kenyan legislation and 
international instruments, conference papers, and journal articles. Online newspaper articles 
were also used to furnish the context of some of the events outlined in this study. 
1.6 Specific objectives and Chapter Summary 
The specific objectives of this study were met within the chapters of this dissertation. The 
Kenyan public prosecution theory, common good as a central norm of society’s order, and 
prudence as a guiding principle for leadership are contemplated in chapter three. 
Chapter four covered the description of case law. The cases are exclusively Kenyan hate speech 
cases. To supplement the discussion in this chapter, the Parliament Hansard report with 
discussions vis-à-vis the creation of the NCIC was also utilised. The Hansard elucidates the 
legislative intent behind the NCI Act. 
The main theme investigated in chapter five was whether the general principles in chapter three 
applied to the cases described in chapter four. Issues probed include, whether the theory of 
prosecution discussed in chapter three translated into actual practice in Kenyan courts. Thus, 
from the general principles in chapter three, deductions will be made. In line with the principle 
of the purpose of rhetoric, outlined in the theoretical framework, a causal link will be made 
between reckless utterances such as hate speech and incitement to violence made by leaders. 
A comparison was also drawn between prosecution of hate speech in the ICTR and Kenyan 
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prosecution. Finally, the chapter suggests an approach to prosecution of hate speech that the 
ODPP can apply within a reworked legal framework. 
Chapter six elaborates conclusions drawn from the foregoing chapters and recommendations. 
1.7 Scope and limitations of the study 
The online portal for Kenya law reports does not provide judgments made in the magistracy. 
This may be attributed to these judgements not forming precedent35. Therefore, the only other 
means of accessing these judgements related to hate speech, such as the Moses Kuria36, 
Ferdinand Waititu37, and Chirau Ali Makwere38 cases would be getting access to the files from 
the criminal registry of the trial courts. 
This also proved problematic, due to the political implications of these cases, registrars are not 
willing to open the case files to persons who are not enjoined in the suit in any manner. This 
introduces the second limitation of the study, the political implications surrounding some of 
the cases. While it would be informative to properly decipher if there are in fact any political 
factors that may lead to the acquittal of politicians, this information would be difficult to verify 
and consequently, should be confined to the realm of conjecture. 
Therefore, the scope of the paper was informed by these limitations. One of the assumptions 
the research has made is that the prosecution has not been encumbered in carrying out its duties 
                                                 
35 -<http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=124> on 29 January 2018. 
36 R v Ferdinand Waititu & Another Nairobi Chief Magistrate Court Criminal Case No.470 of 2012. 
37 The Ferdinand Waititu case that was concluded in the magistracy should not be confused with the High Court 
case Benson Riitho Mureithi v J. W. Wakhungu & 2 others [2014] eKLR where the plaintiff challenged Ferdinand 
Waititu’s appointment to the Athi Water Services Board. One of the issues to be determined by the High Court 
was whether the arrest and subsequent charging of Ferdinand Waititu with hate speech on 27th September 2012 
was enough to render his appointment illegal. The High Court rejected this argument stating that another court 
was still handling the matter and the High Court would be infringing on the lower court’s mandate leading to a 
violation of the sub-judice rule. The magistracy case is, R v Ferdinand Waititu & Another Nairobi Chief Magistrate 
Court Criminal Case No.470 of 2012. 
38 Republic v. Chirau Ali Makwere, Nairobi Chief Magistrates’ Court, Cr. Case No. 1215 of 2012. 
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by these political undertones. Legal and philosophical principles, case law and reports are thus 




2.0 Literature Review 
Scholarly works used in this research covered three broad topics: the interaction between 
freedom of speech and hate speech; philosophical notions on human conduct; and an 
illustration of hate speech and its prosecution in Kenyan context. 
Articles that considered hate speech from a rights and duties perspective juxtaposed the legal 
response to hate speech with the right to free speech39. Two contrary responses are evident in 
these articles: the freedom of speech approach, and the consequentialist approach. Libertarian 
notions justify the free speech approach, which posits that hate speech should be treated as 
protected speech40.  The proponents of the free speech approach affirm that applying the law 
in this manner would bring about the common good41. This position is illustrated by the 
evolution of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) regarding hate 
speech42. 
The libertarian position was instrumental in providing this research with a potential solution to 
the problem contemplated by the paper, politically instigated hate speech. It falls short 
however, in certain respects. Authors such as Susan Benesch address these shortcomings whilst 
critiquing the free speech approach to hate speech. Positing that it is not only unsuitable when 
                                                 
39 Benesch S, ‘Election-Related Violence: The Role of Dangerous Speech’, American Society of International 
Law Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, 2011, 389—
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5305/procannmeetasil.105.0389> on 7 Oct 2017; and Simpson R, ‘Dignity, 
Harm, and Hate Speech’ 32(6) Law and Philosophy, 2013. 
40 Heyman S, Free Speech and Human Dignity, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2008, Chapter 8; 
and Brink D, ‘Millian Principles, Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech’ 7(2) Legal Theory, 2001. 
41 Brink D, ‘Millian Principles, Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech’ 7(2) Legal Theory, 2001. 
42 Heyman in chapter 8 charts the gradual evolution of the treatment of hate speech in the United States Supreme 
Court from the initial outlaw of fighting words in Brandenburg v Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969), to the eventual 
declaration that insults form part of protected speech per the first amendment in Gooding v Wilson 405 U.S. 518 
(1972). See generally, Heyman S, Free Speech and Human Dignity, Chapter 8. 
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dealing with politically instigated hate speech, but it is also potentially harmful to society43. 
Benesch’s puts forth the consequentialist approach, which recommends that hate speech should 
be prohibited not because it is offensive or insulting but rather because of its potential to lead 
to violence44. 
This is not to say that consequentialism is not the ultimate solution. It is largely a legal response 
to a socio-political problem that exists outside the scope of courts of law, due to this, it is also 
insufficient45. While consequentialism gives a practical means to prosecuting hate speech, it 
does not address secondary issues such as: the empowerment of the DPP to actually prosecute 
politicians; and incendiary rhetoric, with its adverse effects on the common good. This 
necessitated the study of philosophical schools of thought that considered the societal aspect 
of the problem. 
The solution it would seem, lay in classic philosophy. Despite most works of classic philosophy 
falling outside the ten-year timeline of the sources used in the literature review, they were 
instrumental in providing much needed context to a human conundrum. The postulates of 
Aristotle were included to propose an objective for the law; can the law alone achieve the 
common good for all persons? Or rather, is it via the cultivation of a positive ethical standard 
that hate speech can be prosecuted by the DPP and subsequently avoided by politicians? These 
queries also justified the inclusion of modern works dealing with the effects of human conduct, 
Virtuous Leadership by Alexandre Havard sought to answer these questions46. 
                                                 
43 Benesch, ‘Inciting Genocide, Pleading Free Speech’ 21(2) World Policy Journal, 2004. 
44 Benesch, Election-Related Violence: The Role of Dangerous Speech, 390. 
45 Benesch, Election-Related Violence: The Role of Dangerous Speech, 390. 
46 Havard A, Virtuous Leadership: An Agenda for Personal Excellence, Scepter Publishers, United States of 
America, 2007, 57. 
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To provide background to the problem, documents on the history of the acts and omissions of 
the ODPP regarding hate speech prosecution, and the ODPP’s public struggle for independence 
have been used47. Furthermore, these articles and textbooks provide an insight into the 
legislative intent of separating the ODPP’s functions from the AG’s office48, this being the 
provision of assurances to the public that the days of executive’s intimidation of independent 
offices were over49. 
Kenyan legal scholars have focussed primarily on the political ramifications of hate speech, 
and not necessarily on its legal and societal consequences50. Peter Onyango Onyoyo in 
Criminality in “Hate Speech” Provision in the Laws of Kenya- Jurisprudential Challenges51, 
explains the criminal implications of hate speech, how the political class have used hate speech 
to intimidate and antagonise their opponents and why there are seldom any cases in Kenyan 
courts52. Onyoyo’s focus is centred on the political themes informing the ODPP’s response to 
hate speech. This precluded the analysis of this paper due to the limitations set in the research. 
Reports by the judiciary provided institutional objectives of the ODPP, which serve as 
examples of policy-based considerations made considering the ODPP’s legal obligations53. The 
ODPP intends to enhance its capacity to prosecute more crimes by increasing its staff to tackle 
                                                 
47 Waikwa, ‘The Director of Public Prosecutions and The Constitution: Inspiration, Challenges and 
Opportunities’; and Mbondenyi M and Ambani J, The New Constitutional Law of Kenya. 
48 Article 156, Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
49 Waikwa, ‘The Director of Public Prosecutions and The Constitution: Inspiration, Challenges and 
Opportunities’; and Republic v Director of Public Prosecution & another Ex Parte Chamanlal Vrajlal Kamani & 
2 others [2015] eKLR. 
50 Onyoyo P, ‘Criminality in Hate Speech Provisions in the Laws of Kenya-Jurisprudential Challenges’, 
University of Nairobi, 2014. 
51 Onyoyo, ‘Criminality in Hate Speech Provisions in the Laws of Kenya-Jurisprudential Challenges’. 
52 Onyoyo, ‘Criminality in Hate Speech Provisions in the Laws of Kenya-Jurisprudential Challenges’. 
53 The Kenya Judiciary, State of the Judiciary and Administration of Justice-Annual Report, 2015, 93. 
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the demands of the criminal justice system54. Despite being in line with the DPP’s power of 
delegation55, this measure still does not entirely solve the issue of how the DPP handles cases 
that affect the public interest (as anticipated by Article 157 of the COK). This is because the 
ODPP’s staff are ultimately guided by the exercise of the DPP’s discretionary powers56. 
The KNCHR in its report, On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of Kenya’s 
Post-2007 Election Violence affirm that there is a causal link that exists between incitement 
via hate speech and wanton violence57. While the reports do not purport that incitement is the 
only cause of the violence they do state that it was one of the main causes58. This report shows 
that due to the violence caused by incitement there is sufficient cause to demand the immediate 
and conclusive prosecution of hate speech by the ODPP59. It is also noted that due to the lack 
of the independence of the judiciary, the effective prosecution of these cases is hampered60. 
  
                                                 
54 The Kenya Judiciary, State of the Judiciary and Administration of Justice-Annual Report, 2015, 93. 
55 Section 22, Office of The Director of Public Prosecutions (Act No. 2 of 2013). 
56 Article 157, Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
57 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of 
Kenya’s Post-2007 Election Violence, 2008. 
58 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of 
Kenya’s Post-2007 Election Violence, 2008, para.391. 
59 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of 
Kenya’s Post-2007 Election Violence, 2008, para.735. 
60 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of 
Kenya’s Post-2007 Election Violence, 2008, para.695. 
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3.0 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework will be informed by two principles: prosecution theory, specifically 
the legal principle of prerogative powers of the prosecutor; prudence as a principle of 
governance and leadership; and the concept of the common good as the organising principle of 
society. 
Hate speech is a phenomenon that leads to the abrogation of the common good, therefore 
prudence will not be limited to the leadership and governance, it will also be applied to the 
exercise of the prerogative powers of the prosecutor and as part of the prosecutor’s 
responsibility to achieve the common good. This implies that the ODPP should practice 
prudence as an underpinning norm as well. 
3.1 The prosecutor’s prerogative powers  
The powers of the DPP are enshrined in the 2010 CoK and are elaborated further in the ODPP 
Act. Among the different powers of the ODPP; this paper will focus on the specific statutes 
that empower the DPP to prosecute hate speech and incitement to violence. These statutes 
include section 21 of the EO Act and section 25 of the NCI Act. Article 157 of the CoK makes 
it clear that, the ODPP is empowered to institute criminal proceedings in any matter that affects 
the public interest and hence disrupts social order. This is in accordance with the principles of 
administrative justice and prevents the abuse of rights. 
The prosecutor’s powers have been extensively discussed in Kenyan jurisprudence and more 
so in the cases used in this research. The theory of prosecution in this study, will refer to these 
cases. Thereafter, the extent that the cases deviate or conform to the theory will also be 
elaborated upon. Jurisprudence will also be used while considering the overarching topic of the 
research, that is the prosecution of hate speech. 
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For instance, the power of nolle prosequi was discussed expansively in the case Republic v 
Michael Rotich & 2 others61. The matter in contention was whether the DPP should be allowed 
to discontinue a criminal suit against a person accused of murder effectively acquitting the 
accused, and if by the court not allowing this discontinuance, a breach of the rights of the 
accused would occur. The court stressed that the DPP may only discontinue a suit after 
justifying the exercise of nolle prosequi to the satisfaction of the trial court. The court 
emphasized: “The Director for Public Prosecutions may not discontinue a prosecution without 
the permission of the court (…)”62. 
The DPP’s power to discontinue a suit is subject to checks and balances: while his powers are 
unfettered, they are still subject to review by the trial court. The court is thus bound to respect 
the prosecution’s activities and only intervenes when it deems substantial bad faith, oppression 
or misuse of the court process may ensue. The prosecution is charged with providing a 
reasonable and probable cause for instituting a suit, otherwise it opens itself to an unfavourable 
review by the court63. 
The dicta of Republic v Director of Public Prosecution & another Ex Parte Chamanlal Vrajlal 
Kamani & 2 others64 explained the relationship between the court and the prosecution’s power 
to institute or stop a suit. The court relied on the speech of Lord Salmon in the case D.P.P v 
Humphrey’s65, where he stated that: 
                                                 
61 [2016] eKLR. 
62 Republic v Michael Rotich & 2 others [2016] eKLR. 
63 Republic v Director of Public Prosecutions & 3 others Ex-Parte Meridian Medical Center Ltd & 7 others [2015] 
eKLR. 
64 [2015] eKLR. 
65 (1976) 2 All ER 497. 
24 
 
“A judge has not and should not appear to have any responsibility for the institution of 
prosecutions, nor has he any power to refuse to allow a prosecution to proceed merely because 
he considers that as a matter of policy, it ought not to have been brought. It is only if the 
prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious 
that the judge has the power to interfere.”66 
Chamanlal is relevant here because it dealt with the prosecutor’s prerogative in highly sensitive 
public interest matters. Matters of public interest refer to the common good of the people. The 
matter of interest, in this case, was the prosecution of persons accused of involvement in the 
Anglo Leasing Corruption scandal; an issue that had gripped the Kenyan public’s attention67. 
In terms of the common good, hate speech and incitement to violence are as important as the 
corruption scandal due to the disruption they cause within the social order. 
In the case of Seenoi Ene Parsimei Esho Sisina & 8 others v Attorney General68, Odunga J 
elaborates upon the situations within which the court may intervene to ensure the bona fide 
exercise of the powers of prosecution. Stating: 
“In my view, the decision whether or not to enter a nolle prosequi is an exercise of discretion 
and ought to be exercised on bona fide based reasons. (…) The court can only intervene in the 
following situations: where there is an abuse of discretion; where the decision-maker exercises 
discretion for an improper purpose; where the decision-maker is in breach of the duty to act 
fairly; where the decision-maker has failed to exercise statutory discretion reasonably; where 
the decision-maker  acts in a manner to frustrate the purpose of the Act donating the power; 
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where the decision-maker fetters the discretion given; where the decision-maker fails to 
exercise discretion; where the decision-maker  is irrational and unreasonable.”69 
The obiter dicta of Odunga J imply a remedy available to persons when the ODPP abuses its 
discretionary powers. This remedy is the judicial review of the ODPP’s decisions. Judicial 
review is conducted by the court and can be sought by citizens. While it is trite law that the 
ODPP is an independent office, it is not precluded from review. There are some limits placed 
upon the review of the prosecutor’s discretionary powers. These include, the legality of the 
decision-making process is the sole parameter subject to review, and the grounds of review are 
restricted to illegal acts, irrational acts, and procedural impropriety70. 
It just so happened that Odunga J also adjudicated upon a case where the ODPP’s use of the 
nolle prosequi power was challenged. The suit was based on the perceived inaction of the 
public prosecutor in the case Republic v The Director of Public Prosecution & 7 Others71. The 
applicants sought to compel the ODPP to amend a charge sheet and institute criminal 
proceedings against another party. The court averred that the ODPP power to institute and drop 
a prosecution is “purely discretionary”. Furthermore, the court declared that ordering the ODPP 
to prosecute or not outside the scope of the grounds of review would be “outside the ambit of 
the judicial review relief of mandamus”72. 
Regarding the power to institute prosecutions, there also exists a test in law that the ODPP uses 
to determine whether it will prosecute or not. This test was discussed in the case Republic v 
Director of Public Prosecutions & another Ex-Parte Communications Commission of Kenya73. 
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In this situation, it is evident that the Kenyan judge agreed with the obiter at the Queen’s Bench 
in the case R v DPP Exp. Manning74, which stated that two criteria are to be relied upon before 
instituting a public prosecution: whether there is a reasonable prospect of landing a conviction 
as a judgement; and, whether the evidence adduced during the investigations is reliable75. In 
addition, these investigations should not be used to seek redress in an individual’s civil 
matter76. Rather, they should be done with the public interest as the central concern77. 
The environment within which the ODPP operates is also expounded in Kenyan jurisprudence. 
The seminal case on the interaction between the ODPP and the expectations of the public 
played out in the case Republic v Director of Public Prosecution & another Ex Parte 
Chamanlal Vrajlal Kamani & 2 others78. One of the issues to be determined in the case was 
the circumstances which would spur the ODPP to institute a suit. The fact in issue was the theft 
of millions of Kenyan shillings through the sale of fake government contracts79. 
The court held that the prosecutor in such instances should be mindful of the public opinion 
and act in the best interests of the Kenyan people. The trial judge stated that the ODPP has the 
misfortune of being in a “politically intolerant environment where the executive wants to 
micromanage independent constitutional bodies”80. 
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Odunga J goes on to lament that because of these circumstances, the prosecution inexorably 
finds itself fettered when it shouldn’t be. As such, it is essential for the court to be mindful of 
this and act as a check and balance to the ODPP to allow it to exercise its powers solely for the 
benefit of the common good of the people. 
This check applies both ways. The ODPP must be estopped by the trial court from “stage 
managing” criminal proceedings to achieve an acquittal that should appease the public81. The 
office must also be encouraged to freely prosecute prominent persons that may enjoy the 
protection of the executive. 
The court is cognisant that it is difficult for public prosecutions to be conducted under the thrall 
of an intolerant executive. A situation aptly described by Odunga J: 
“This is what this country finds itself in. A pathetic situation where independent constitutional 
commissions and office are browbeaten and bullied into total submission and forced in the 
process to become an appendage of an executive that is intolerant of dissenting opinion and 
allergic to objective and independent institutions that exercise their powers according to the 
dictates of the law.”82 
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3.2 Prudence and the common good 
The cases illustrated above indicate that issues of the public interest such as corruption, hate 
speech and incitement to violence put social order and the common good at high risk. This 
public interest and common good must be informed by the same classic theories, Aristotelian 
principles, and prudence83. 
Aristotle elaborates the notion of order in society and the body politic. For there to be a good 
society there needs to be good citizens and prudent leaders. The end of the interaction of both 
is the common good. He states that there exists a higher good that is pursued by the society and 
the political class. This good is understood as the common good; the social condition that 
allows everyone, as an individual and a group to achieve the good, this is the responsibility of 
the political class84. 
The next step therefore would be to ask, how does the political class contribute to the realisation 
of the common good? This query leads to the practical application of the principle of prudence 
in leadership in relation to the achievement of the common good, as the purpose of the actions 
of the political class. The principle of prudence also extends to the prosecutor and the court. 
The research will therefore examine the prosecution of hate speech, as incited within political 
activity. Hate speech within the context of political activity leads to the curtailing of the 
common good, necessitating the action of the prosecutor to restore the common good. 
Elaborating on the politician’s speech on his treatise in rhetoric, Aristotle recognised the danger 
of reckless speech and its disruption of the social order. The main critique is that the framers 
of dangerous speech paid more attention to the powers of persuasion of the speaker in a 
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deceitful manner that meant to incite emotion85. They give the politician room to persuade their 
public by fair means or foul86. It is explicitly mentioned that politicians, if left to their own 
devices, may inspire prejudice, pity, or anger among their public to ensure they retain power87. 
What is a realistic standard that can be placed upon politicians when addressing the public? 
Their speech and acts must be prudent and directed to truth and justice, to achieve the common 
good. Truth is essential so that the public may know that which is good and be convinced that 
the good that their leadership is pursuing is worthwhile. Justice implies that in the political 
context that their rights and freedoms should be upheld88. The common good is not a privilege 
but a right essential to the good of all89. 
There is a danger to be avoided, because politicians are called upon to use their powers of 
persuasion for the good. Failure to do so can lead to violence and unrest. In Rhetoric, it is 
posited that when rhetoric conveys injustice or deceit then it has the potential to cause great 
harm90. Due to its nature as an art form concerned with the welfare of a large group of persons, 
a large group of persons may suffer as a result91. 
To lead and serve the people, it is essential for the leader to cultivate prudence. Prudence is 
defined as the art of effective decision making92. It goes without saying that good decision 
making is paramount to the achievement of the common good93. Prudence in this instance is 
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not limited to the actions of politicians. It is the virtue of leadership in every instance, 
consequently the ODPP is also directly concerned with the public interest94. In fact, the three 
steps to prudent decision making posited by Alexandre Havard in Virtuous Leadership95, 
resemble the two-step prosecutor’s test discussed in the case Republic v Director of Public 
Prosecutions & another Ex-Parte Communications Commission of Kenya96. The three steps 
are as follows: deliberation, which entails the accumulation of information to establish a 
relevant set of facts to inform the decision; judgement, evaluation of this information; and 
finally, the actual decision making97. The two-step prosecutor’s test was formulated to 
determine the instances where a prosecutor may decide to initiate proceedings. It provides two 
criteria: first, that evidence adduced is reliable (much in line with the deliberation phase of 
prudent decision making); and second, there is a reasonable chance to land a conviction as per 
the evaluation of the prosecutor this refers to the two steps of judgement and deciding to 
prosecute the case. 
Politicians should make informed decisions about what they communicate to the public. What 
does this information pertain to? The politician should understand that they are leading people, 
and consequently are charged with the betterment of their livelihoods. To understand what is 
essential for human flourishing, they must understand the human person. Therefore, politicians 
must be students of human nature so that they may be able to make decisions that truly benefit 
people98. A modicum of philosophical and moral knowledge of persons is necessary. It is 
impossible for politicians to make sound statements that would eventually be to the benefit of 
citizens without this principle in mind. 
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The consequences of hate speech, such as violence and ostracism between communities are in 
direct conflict with the common good especially when the hate speech is perpetrated by leaders. 
Hate speech’s consequences deprive citizens of an essential good that is due to them: a peaceful 
existence where one can flourish99. 
Hate speech also engenders injustice. Additionally, the laxity in prosecution of hate speech by 
political leaders further perpetuates injustice. The pursuit of justice is a norm of that informs 
the conduct of the ODPP. It is provided for in statute, the ODPP is charged with being cognisant 
of the principles of natural justice and act in the service of the cause of justice100. Havard 
affirms that the achievement of justice in a community is dependent on whether leaders within 
that community fulfil their duties to the public, doing so, they render an essential service for 
their citizens101. 
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4.0 The Prosecution of Hate Speech in Kenya 
4.1 Introduction 
The case law on hate speech will be scrutinised to define hate speech within the context of the 
NCI Act (“the Act”), the context leading to the Act, the claims politicians have made in relation 
to the Act, and the interpretation of the court apropos these claims. 
a. Alan Wadi Okengo v Republic102: Defining Hate Speech 
This case was an appeal that arose from a conviction and sentence in the Nairobi Magistracy, 
Case No. 1 of 2015. Alan Wadi was charged with hate speech in the first trial court contrary to 
section 13(1)(a)(b) and (2) of the NCI Act. Section 13 broadly defines the crime and 
subsequently, its punishment. 
The court upheld that the mens rea of hate speech is the intent to “stir up ethnic hatred, or 
having regard to the circumstances, ethnic hatred is likely to be stirred up”103. According to the 
Act, intent is expressed via the use of threatening or abusive words or behaviour, or written 
material with the same content; the publishing of this material; the presentation of this material 
in the form of a play104; the distribution of said play via a recording or images of the same; or 
the provision or production of a programme105. 
The actus reus was the publication of a message on the appellant’s Facebook page. The 
magistrate ascertained that the content of the message, amounted to the incitement of hate 
between members of various ethnic groups in Kenya (the mens rea). The act also expands the 
definition of “ethnic hatred”:  
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(…) hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to colour, race, nationality 
(including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins106. 
There was the secondary charge of undermining the authority of a public officer107. Alan Wadi 
pled guilty on both counts and was sentenced to serve a one-year term in prison per count. 
Upon appeal, the appellant did not challenge the judgement of hate speech. He relied on 
procedural errors made by the prosecution. For the sake of a legal argument however, the 
research will exclude the faulty nature of the charge sheet presented by the prosecution at this 
point. 
When analysing of this case, one may determine that jurisprudence surrounding hate speech 
has grown rather than attenuated. The appellate court faulted the magistracy and prosecution 
for their failure to fully investigate the mental status of the accused, and the particulars of the 
secondary charge on the charge sheet. These issues did not affect the accuracy of the event that 
led to the occurrence of hate speech. As stated above, the definition of the actus reus and mens 
rea of hate speech was a valid one that can be relied upon by other courts based on the Act and 
this case. 
b. Chirau Ali Makwere v Robert M. Mabera & 4 others108: The Constitutionality and 
Enforcement of the NCI Act  
The case originated from a request made to the Chirau Ali Makwere (the petitioner) a Cabinet 
Minister and Member of Parliament (MP) Matuga Constituency, to record a statement 
regarding statements he made during a political rally. The petition challenged the 
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constitutionality of provisions of the Act, the basis of the request to record the statement. The 
specific provisions included section 13, 14 and 62. Section 13, defines hate speech and outlines 
its punishment. Section 14 provides the exceptions to the preceding section, and finally, section 
62 defines the offence of ethnic or racial contempt as well as its punishment.  
The petition sought to not only render the said provisions unconstitutional, it also sought to 
justify words he uttered during a rally in Kombani area at Matuga as being protected speech. 
The statement made was allegedly as follows: 
“Waswahili na Waarabu tuna uchungu sanasana, walitugandamiza, wakatufanya watumwa, 
hatutakubali, hatutakubali, sisi, sisi, kamawalivyofanya mababuzetu, walisema wale Wadigo, 
Wakamba na Waduruma tukawa nunua kama makaa (…) Nawaonya watu wa bara waliona 
ukabila wataona cha mtemakuni (…)109. 
The essence of the above statement is that the Swahili and Arabic peoples are responsible for 
the historical injustices that native people suffered. The MP ends the statement with a threat, 
the people from the hinterland i.e. mainland Kenya, should stand warned, due to the injustices 
they meted out on indigenous coastal peoples110. 
Chirau denied making these statements and suggested that as a leader he was entitled to agitate 
on the inequalities that exist in society, more specifically those that adversely affect his people. 
The legal implications that accompanied this argument were based on: the speech was protected 
under Article 33 of the CoK, as free speech; and the sections on which his petition was based 
were unconstitutional. Chirau asserted that his statements would not constitute one of the 
exceptions provided in Article 33. These being, propaganda for war, incitement to violence, 
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hate speech and advocacy of hatred. The provisions’ unconstitutionality lay in their lack of 
legislative intent. Limiting the right of free speech, constituted, according to him, a violation 
of Article 24(2)(a) and (b) of the CoK, the limitation of rights clause. This lack of 
constitutionality extended to the actions of the respondents as well, for they intended to charge 
the petitioner with the alleged offence of ethnic or racial contempt within the provisions section 
62(1) of the NCI Act as read with sections 13 and 14 of the same act. 
There arguments of the respondents provided insight into the procedure of prosecuting hate 
speech and the aims that the NCIC and the ODPP have when prosecuting the crime. In support 
of these aims, are the principles set out in Articles 24 and 33 of the CoK. The respondents were 
the NCIC, the Chief Inspector of Police, and the Attorney General. 
The NCIC, opposed the petition stating that there was a complaint made by the Executive 
Director of Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) that claimed that the petitioner made 
statements amounting to hate speech. Complaints are one of the triggers of investigation into a 
claim of hate speech111. Upon investigation of the complaint, the NCIC forwarded the findings 
of the investigation to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) for further inquiry. The 
aim of the investigation was to determine whether an offence had been committed under the 
provisions of the Act. No decision to prosecute had been taken at that time. 
The first respondent was the police officer investigating the complaint lodged against the 
petitioner. The inspector had received the complaint from the NCIC and initiated investigations 
into the allegations of the commission of ethnic and racial contempt via statements made by 
the petitioner. After the investigation, the inspector forwarded the resulting report to the ODPP. 
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The AG asserted that the sections in contention within the NCI Act were not in contradiction 
with the CoK. Rather, they complimented Article 33 of the CoK and were in line with the 
limitations the article places on the exercise of freedom of speech. Furthermore, the AG stated 
that the suit lodged by the MP was premature; criminal proceedings had not been instituted 
against the petitioner. The claims made by the petitioner could only be discussed at a criminal 
trial court. 
The court analysed hate speech in this case drawing from the Constitution of Kenya, and the 
experience of international law provisions ratified by Kenya that inspired Article 33. The 
significance of this analysis was to show the interaction of two operating principles, free 
expression of the right and the extent to which the right functions. It was stated by the court 
that the right to freedom of speech included the right to: 
“(…) seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either 
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art or through any other media of his choice.”112 
The court noted that the practice in international law was to not only permit the banning of 
certain speech, but to demand the active criminalisation of speech that undermines the rights 
and freedoms of others. The court cited the case Mark Gova Chavunduka and Another v The 
Minister of Home Affairs113 which held that the freedom of expression was essential in a 
democracy due to the four special objectives that it ought to serve: 
“(…) (i) it helps an individual attain self-fulfilment; (ii) it assists in the discovery of truth and 
in promoting political and social participation; (iii) it strengthens the capacity of an individual 
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to participate in decision making; and it provides a mechanism by which it would be possible 
to establish a reasonable balance between stability and change ….”114 
Furthermore, the court stressed that the freedom of expression is, 
“(…) neither absolute nor boundless; most democratic societies impose limitations on freedom 
of expressions (sic) which attempt to balance the freedom of expression and the societal or 
public interest and the rights of others.”115 
These goals are also shared by the ODPP116. The court then delineated the reasons behind the 
prohibition of hate speech. Apart from maintaining public order, limitations placed on speech 
are also protective in nature. They seek to prevent,  
“psychological harm to targeted groups that would effectively impair their ability to (…) 
contribute to society. Prohibition of hate speech prevents visible exclusion of minority groups 
that would deny them equal opportunities (…) hate speech is a direct invasion of the dignity of 
individuals and communities.”117 
The court upheld the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act on hate speech. The court 
referred to the long title of the act and the history of its creation. The act was made in response 
to the 2008 post-election violence, its formulation was based on the National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation Agreement118. Parliament discussed the progress of the Bill in light of the 
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division caused by the violence119, from the discussions, it intended to prevent new “flare-ups” 
of violence120. There was a general consensus in parliament that the fast tracking of the Bill 
was necessitated by the importance of reasserting public order121. The long title averred that 
the purpose of the act was to encourage, 
 “(…) national cohesion and integration by outlawing discrimination on ethnic grounds; to 
provide for the establishment, powers and functions of the National Cohesion and Integration 
Commission (…)”122. 
The airing of grievances of his constituents by the petitioner can be said to be free speech, as 
long as it does not constitute hate speech. What these provisions aim to criminalise is the 
incitement to hatred and violence among various groups123. Therefore, the court declared the 
statute constitutional. 
The High Court agreed with the respondents use of procedure as well, stating that the NCIC 
acted within its constitutional and statutory mandate by conducting investigations into the 
occurrence of hate speech, noting that section 59 of the NCI Act empowered the NCIC to do 
so. The complaint received was also made within the parameters of enforcement of the 
objectives of the Act124. The court also noted that the lodging of a complaint was not 
tantamount to the institution of prosecution proceedings; thus, avoiding the petition made for 
orders of certiorari lodged by the plaintiff125. 
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Finally, the court reaffirmed the independence of the NCIC and the ODPP as bodies charged 
with the investigation of hate speech in as much as it threatens the public order. By virtue of 
their independence, the courts cannot interfere in their ordinary exercise of their discretion. The 
only instance that interference would be warranted is if the abuse of rights is occasioned. Due 
to the court’s role as a custodian of the Bill of Rights126. The court found that there was no need 
to interfere in this case, for it saw no breach of the petitioner’s rights127.  
Hate speech charges were eventually confirmed but, the ODPP dropped charges instituted 
against the petitioner128. The decision was made after Chirau Ali Makwere apologised for his 
statements, thereafter MUHURI and the NCIC sought to withdraw the complaint and suit 
respectively129. The decision of the DPP to enter a nolle prosequi seemed to have been 
influenced by these withdrawals. Prima facie, these withdrawals were in line with the objective 
of conciliation; one of the aims of the NCIC130, the same cannot be said however, of the 
decision of the nolle prosequi order131. While the order was not made in bad faith, the 
prosecution in this instance should have recognised that the offence in issue was not merely 
affecting the complainants, it affected the Arabic and Swahili communities as a whole132. Hate 
speech, by definition, is speech directed to a whole community and not institutions affiliated 
to the protection of the rights of said community i.e. MUHURI. Therefore, the ODPP’s 
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objective of prosecuting a case on behalf of groups that have suffered an abuse of rights and 
ensure that criminal justice is served for the whole community133. 
A similar issue arose in Mohamed Abdow Mohamed v R134, the applicant was accused of 
murder. Later, the family of the deceased was approached by the family of the accused and a 
traditional method of dispute resolution was used to settle the case135. As such, the family of 
the deceased wrote to the DPP requesting the discontinuance of the case.  
The main issue to be determined was whether a murder charge can be withdrawn on account 
of the settlement between the families. Referring to Article 157 of the CoK, the court found 
that the ODPP utilised its powers in a manner consistent with the ends of justice by 
discontinuing the suit. The court allowed the appeal, and the accused was discharged. 
Mohamed Abdow represents the emergence of criminal jurisprudence that prevents the state 
from being the proper plaintiff in criminal suits. This is not in line with public interest litigation. 
R v DPP & another Ex parte Chamanlal136 makes this distinction clear, matters of public 
interest supersede individual interests. More so if these issues threaten the public order. 
c. Johnstone Muthama & 8 others v Inspector General of Police & 2 others137: The 
Gravity of Hate Speech Perpetrated by Politicians 
The DPP had not brought charges against the six at the time this appeal was launched. 
Therefore, the object of the appeal was to reverse the rejection of a bail application by the Chief 
Magistrate. The rejection of the bail application was instigated by an application made by the 
                                                 
133 Section 4, Office of The Director of Public Prosecutions (Act No. 2 of 2013). 
134 [2013] eKLR. 
135 The family of the deceased was given livestock based on Islamic law and customs. Mohamed Abdow Mohamed 
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DPP in the trial court, where he requested the court to detain the petitioners during the conduct 
of investigations into the allegations of hate speech. 
The trial magistrate agreed with the application based on two arguments proffered by the 
ODPP. These being, first, the persons accused of hate speech were likely going to interfere 
with witnesses; and second, the prosecution needed a period of four days to finalize the 
investigations. The trial court confirmed the reason. 
The appeal before the High Court was based on a claim by the petitioners which asserted that 
the rejection of their bail application was a denial of their constitutional rights. They argued 
that, while the right to bail was a limited one, the circumstances where bail can be limited are 
solely exceptional ones. There must be compelling reasons provided by the court in taking the 
decision to limit the right. 
Additional arguments that were also presented sought to denounce the reasons given to deny 
bail by the Magistrate’s Court. The Magistrate’s Court held that because of the position and 
influence of the accused persons, it was very likely that there would be interference with 
witnesses. The petitioners rebutted this position stating that this reason was unfounded and 
baseless, they argued that witness interference is a crime per se and cannot form one of the 
reasons to deny bail. 
The ODPP subsequently sought to clarify the rationale behind the decision of the trial court to 
deny bail. Relying chiefly on the argument that witness interference would occur, they stated 
that the crime in issue threatened national security; thus, the prudent course of action would be 
to prevent the continued interaction between the accused persons and their supporters. The 
respondents concluded their arguments with an exposition on the rationale of bail applications. 
The determination of bail is based on a case by case analysis of the circumstances of the case; 
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based on the nature of the crime and the position the petitioners hold in society, the decision to 
reject the bail application was a valid one. 
The High Court agreed with the decision of the trial court138. Stating that, bail is a limitable 
right and the exceptional circumstances that warrant the denial of bail cannot be fully indexed 
to form a comprehensive test. A case by case approach would yield the best results139. The onus 
lies on the prosecutor to show that these compelling reasons exist and warrant the denial of 
bail. The ODPP gave two reasons, stating that the accused persons would very likely interfere 
with the investigations, and there was a need to finalize investigations. 
The rationale underlying the High Court’s decision elucidated the stance the court had on the 
pervasive nature of hate speech: 
“The circumstances are exceptional. The Petitioners face relatively serious crimes. They may 
not be a flight risk but certainly their influence in society is not to be ignored or gainsaid. A 
threat to witnesses and witness interference as well as intimidation is anything but new (…) it 
is pretty clear that the Petitioners are accused of conduct which threatens the national fabric. 
The Petitioners, in their own way, have access to thousands of Kenyans. They are politicians 
(…) When they speak or walk, the thousands admire or follow them perhaps for all the wrong 
reasons. It would be more appropriate to have them confined as the DPP wraps up the process 
of formally charging them in court.”140 
The High Court insisted that there is a balance to be struck between the rights of the individual 
and the interests of the public at large. This case provided an instance where the public good 
needed to supersede the individual interest. The objective to be attained by relegating the 
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individual interest is the achievement of state-wide cohesion and the preservation of the 
national fabric. Therefore, the denial of bail was a small price to pay to achieve this. 
d. Republic v Moses Kuria141: Justice versus procedure in hate speech prosecution 
In this case the DPP appealed to the High Court due to being aggrieved by the ruling of the 
trial court to grant the respondent bail pending the trial. Its main contention was that the trial 
court should have taken cognisance of the fact that the accused was a repeat offender. 
Therefore, it was in the best interest of the public to keep the accused in custody until the 
hearing. 
According to the prosecution the respondent’s utterances were a threat to national security, 
especially in an election year.  The prosecution was making its case based on violence in the 
past due to similar utterances. The prudent course of action would be the application of 
prohibitive measure to protect the public order. 
The appellate court in response to the prosecutor’s claim, stated that bail is denied to accused 
persons only when there are compelling reasons to do so. According to case law, to protect the 
public an accused is denied bail if they are prone to repeating the offence. In this instance, the 
court observed that a public figure has added responsibility to speak prudently to avoid sowing 
discord between communities. This decision is in line with article 33 of the CoK.   
The court decided to set Moses Kuria free on more punitive bond and bail terms, instead of 
limiting his freedom. The obiter dicta of the court dissents with this final decision. A similar 
obiter was utilised in, Johnstone Muthama142, concluding that, the ability of prominent leaders 
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to influence large groups necessitated their incarceration, aiming to preserve the integrity of 
the case, and protect social order143. 
The eventual acquittal is attributed to the rejection of the type of evidence presented; the 
Magistrate ruled that the video evidence incriminating Moses Kuria and Ferdinand Waititu of 
hate speech was incorrectly adduced questioning the authenticity of the record144. 
It appears that procedure took precedence to justice. The CoK seeks to prevent this, stating that 
justice shall be administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities145. Meaning that 
if procedure is seen to be encumbering the administration of justice, it should be ignored. The 
meaning of “justice” in article 159 is expanded in article 22 (3) (d) of the same document, 
which states that the court will observe the rules of natural justice in avoiding these procedural 
burdens. 
4.2 Conclusion 
From the described case law, it appears that the ODPP’s response to hate speech could be 
inconsistent, due to the difference between the outcomes suits against politicians and those 
against the common citizen. 
It may be observed that the court recognized that hate speech is a threat to social order, 
however, political leaders are not being convicted for such crimes. The tendency is to acquit 
them, due to an overemphasis on procedure, or the entering of nolle prosequi. While Nolle 
prosequi is within the powers of the prosecutor, it should promote the ends of justice for the 
whole society, instead of providing room for offenders to repeat such offences146. 
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The rationale of the Act is to prevent disunity and combat violence147. It appears that the reality 
in courts has defeated the legislative intent of the NCI Act and Article 33 of the CoK. 
  
                                                 
147 Parliament Hansard Report, 12 March 2008, 1. 
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5.0 Approaches to Prosecuting Hate Speech 
5.1 Introduction 
The deductive method will be used to analyse approaches to prosecution of hate speech in line 
with the general principles in the theoretical framework. The terms of the debate are focussed 
on whether hate speech is a wrong to be prosecuted or whether hate speech is a crucial part of 
free speech.  To dispel ambiguities on these issues, the consequentialist approach, and free 
speech theories by legal scholars on hate speech prosecution within the context of hate speech 
perpetrated by politicians will be used to supplement the suggested approach. The theories 
considered will largely contribute to the debate on whether hate speech is a wrong to be 
prosecuted or whether it is a crucial part of free speech. To provide a more practical basis of 
the arguments herein, hate speech cases from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) will be utilised. 
5.2 The Consequentialist approach 
Consequentialism is based on prosecuting hate speech due to its effects, mainly violence and 
discord in society148. Prosecuting hate speech in anticipation of its consequences entails the 
adoption of a clear definition for the offence, to prevent restriction of legitimate speech149. 
Similarly, the NCI Act provides such a definition, which has been used to garner a conviction 
in the past150. In this regard, Kenyan law has already achieved this objective. The problem 
arises in instances where the law should be applied to politicians, in these cases the ODPP’s 
response appears to have been inconsistent. 
                                                 
148 Benesch S, ‘Election-Related Violence: The Role of Dangerous Speech’, 389-390. 
149 Benesch S, ‘Election-Related Violence: The Role of Dangerous Speech’, 389-390. 
150 Alan Wadi Okengo v Republic [2015] eKLR.  
47 
 
Consequentialism identifies two challenges that arise when dealing with hate speech: 
identifying which speech is unlawful; and formulating a means of limiting its effects in a 
legitimate way without breaching the freedom of expression151. 
A balance must be found between free expression and hate speech. Thus, a distinction needs to 
be made between speech that can cause harm due to its potential to incite violence; and 
offensive speech that is insulting but not harmful152. The court is better placed to determine 
rights in relation to this distinction, it should determine whether speech has potential to broach 
harmful consequences or constitutes mere insults. 
The role of the ODPP is to promote and protect public order, and it is the duty of the court to 
ascertain rights and their infringement. The ODPP initiates suits based on the two step criteria: 
whether the evidence adduced is reliable, and whether there is a reasonable chance to land a 
conviction153. The court also assesses the exercise of the ODPP’s power in relation to rights154. 
This check and balance formula is applied by the court to ensure that public order is respected, 
and free expression is protected. 
The burden of evidence placed on the prosecution may vary depending on the facts of the case. 
If there is a likelihood to incite violence through hateful language, the prosecutor need only 
prove that the influential person not only used hateful language, but also used their position to 
incite violence against another group of people, for instance, another ethnic group155. 
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Kenyan statute has separate offences for incitement to violence and hate speech156. The salient 
difference between the two is the intent of the perpetrator. The NCI Act states that the intent 
of hate speech is to stir up ethnic hatred between groups157. Incitement to violence has neither 
the ethnic qualification, nor the intent to stir hatred. The perpetrator simply intends to make 
other persons engage in violence158. It is therefore difficult in practice to link intent with the 
effects.  
The reality is that hate speech in Kenyan cases, more so perpetrated by politicians, have 
violence as an end, or as an after effect159. This reality is reflected in Kenyan prosecutorial 
procedure. Hate speech cases often have charge sheets with the primary charge of hate speech, 
and the secondary charge of incitement to violence160. 
The ODPP’s endeavour represents a form of the consequentialist approach. This argument 
intends to suggest the direct linkage of incidences of hate speech with the threat of violence in 
the legal framework, calling for a harmonisation between the NCI Act and the Penal Code. 
This may be reflected in the mens rea of the offence. For instance, a perpetrator of hate speech 
may not only intend to engender hate between communities, he may also wish to incite violence 
resulting from that hate161. Such an approach would consider the effects. 
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This dichotomy necessitating the harmonisation of the legal framework was exemplified in the 
ICTR case of Nahimana et al. v. The Prosecutor162, where the prosecution had to show that 
there was a causal link between broadcasts and articles of hate speech and the violence.  
The persons had influence and used it to instigate violence: via the use of disparaging 
statements made against the Tutsi. Ferdinand Nahimana set up the company Radiotélévision 
libre des mille colline (RTLM), while he was also a member of the party Mouvement 
révolutionnaire national pour le développement (MRND)163. He used his position to incite acts 
of genocide and provide information to aid the same164. The conviction of direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide was subsequently reaffirmed in this appeal165. 
5.3 The Freedom of Speech approach 
Nahimana166 represents an illustration where violence occurs due to utterances made. This 
however, may not always be the case. Sometimes hateful statements may be uttered, and the 
violence anticipated due to them does not occur. To claim however, that hateful statements 
without the violent effects cannot be harmful, let alone criminal, would constitute too narrow 
a view of the danger hate speech presents. This claim also ignores reports made within the 
Kenyan context proving that hate speech not only caused harm, but also has the potential to do 
so ab initio167. Therefore, the law needs to prevent hate speech in itself, as Alan Wadi168 and 
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Nahimana169 have shown. Prosecuting occurrences of violence without tackling hate speech 
would exclude the actual cause of that violence. 
The postulate elaborating that restrictions on hate speech should be determined based on a 
harm-prevention paradigm, which holds that, outside the nexus with violence, there is no 
convincing rationale for legally restricting hate speech170. This claim contends that there is no 
general restriction on free speech, contrary to this claim, the NCI Act establishes grounds to 
restrict free speech, if it constitutes hate speech. The threat toward a targeted group is the key 
point to consider171. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Would the prosecution of hate speech solely based on consequences be effective in Kenya? 
The answer to this query must consider that there is in fact, a causal link between occurrences 
of violence and hate speech perpetrated by persons of influence172, which is true in the Kenyan 
context as well173. The perpetrators of hate speech should be prosecuted, instead of waiting to 
see if statements would bring about discord in society. 
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6.0 Recommendations and Conclusions 
The recommendations are based on two considerations: the inconsistent application of the 
ODPP’s powers; and the need to harmonise the legal framework, being the NCI Act and the 
Penal Code, in relation to hate speech, incitement to violence, and protection of freedom of 
expression. This research is an effort to explain the link between hate speech and violence, and 
the crucial role of the ODPP in restoring and maintaining public order. It has also attempted to 
demonstrate that the inconsistent application of the ODPP’s powers to instances of hate speech 
has done more to harm than help the cause of garnering more convictions. 
This inconsistency may come to mean that the law does not apply equally to all persons. It 
appears that the treatment of politicians differs from that applied to citizens174. The fact is, hate 
speech perpetrated by persons of influence175 has more far reaching and dangerous effects than 
inflammatory statements made by ordinary citizens176. It is paramount for the ODPP to 
recognise the threat hate speech poses to groups targeted by such utterances and the citizenry 
at large. This responsibility does not fall solely on the DPP’s shoulders, the legislature and 
courts also have significant roles to play in preventing and convicting criminal activities related 
to hate speech. 
The problems in prosecuting hate speech stem from the laws on hate speech themselves, and 
the application of these laws to relevant situations. Hate speech laws in the NCI Act and the 
EO Act are well drafted but inexorably have contributed to a disjointed prosecution procedure.  
For instance, the NCI Act (Section 13) could be expanded to include violence as the intent of 
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the perpetrator, the position of influence as an aggravating circumstance, and a clear definition 
of persons of influence, that includes generally persons who command a large following in the 
form of supporters of a certain identifiable group. The EO Act limits the advocacy of hatred 
and incitement of violence to an election period177. The act acknowledges that the exercise of 
undue influence during an election period is illicit and attracts criminal sanctions, it is 
considered illicit only when it impedes the proper conduct of the voting process178, however it 
fails to place special restrictions on candidates and persons commanding large following during 
the election period. 
The courts are mindful of this lacuna. In the case of Johnstone Muthama & 8 others v Inspector 
General of Police & 2 others179 it noted that the accused persons had the potential of defeating 
the aims of justice due to the large support each of them commanded. Consequently, the public 
is exposed to the adverse effects of this “power”, especially when the politicians intend to target 
a group using hateful utterances180. 
The prosecution and investigation procedure of hate speech must also significantly improve. If 
Kenyan Courts have recognised the threat hate speech has on the common good, the prosecutor 
should not enter nolle prosequi orders in hate speech cases without proper justification181. 
Certainty is crucial in determining what consists hate speech or not. The court already has a 
firm foundation in Article 33 of the CoK as a starting point. It may also rely on some case law 
that had a broader outlook in determining whether hate speech existed in a particular 
circumstance.  
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It is anticipated that an applicable test can be determined by the courts to aid them in deciding 
cases. The approaches suggested by this research can provide a secondary point of reference 
after the considerations provided in the Kenyan legal framework. This would guide not only 
the DPP in aligning the evidence compiled from investigations to an ascertainable standard, 
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